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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/761,556	01/21/2004	Samuel H. Gellman	09820.168CON	2839

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EXAMINER
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EPPERSON, JON D

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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1639

SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD OF RESPONSE	MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
3 MONTHS	03/09/2007	PAPER

**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire 6 MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.

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<b>Office Action Summary</b>	<b>Application No.</b> 10/761,556	<b>Applicant(s)</b> GELLMAN ET AL.	
	<b>Examiner</b> Jon D. Epperson	<b>Art Unit</b> 1639	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 01 December 2006.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**.                      2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-11 and 14 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-11 and 14 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All    b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)                                | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)                       | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application                       |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____  |

### DETAILED ACTION

1. Applicants response filed December 1, 2006 is acknowledged

#### *Status of the Claims*

2. Claims 1-14 are currently pending.
3. Applicant's response to the Restriction and/or Election of Species requirements is acknowledged (Applicant elected with traverse Group I, claims 1-11 and 14) and claims 12 and 13 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to nonelected inventions, there being no allowable generic or linking claim (see below i.e.,

#### *Response to Restriction and/or Election of Species*.

4. The species election is hereby withdrawn in view of Applicants' arguments (e.g., see 12/1/06 Response, pages 5-6).
5. Therefore, claims 1-11, and 14 are examined on the merits in this action.

#### *Response to Restriction and/or Election of Species*

6. Applicant's election of Group I (claims 1-11 and 14) **with traverse** is acknowledged.
7. The traversal is on the following grounds:

[1] Applicants argue, "Because Applicants have elected product claims, Applicants explicitly reserve their right to rejoin suitable process claims upon an indication of allowable subject matter in the elected product claims" (e.g., see 12/1/06 Response, page 3, paragraph 2).

[1] The Examiner agrees that rejoinder is available in accordance with MPEP § 821.04(b).

[2] Applicants argue, "Applicants respectfully traverse the restriction requirement on the grounds that the Office has not carried the burden of providing any reasons and/or examples to support the conclusion that the claims of the restricted groups are distinct. The Office has characterized the claims of Groups I and III as being directed to related products. Citing MPEP 806.05(j), the Examiner states that claims in this relationship can be shown to be distinct if: (A) the inventions as claimed do not overlap in scope, i.e., they are mutually exclusive; (B) the inventions as claimed are not obvious variants; and (C) the inventions as claimed are either not capable of use together or can have a materially different design, mode of operation, function, or effect. Note that the three requirements are separated by an "and" not an "or." Thus, all three prongs must be satisfied to support a restriction pursuant to this section of the MPEP. The Examiner goes on to state that, in the present application, prior art directed to the "solution phase" compounds of Group I would not anticipate the product recited in Claim 13. Applicants respectfully traverse this comment as being nothing more than a restatement of the conclusion of patentable distinctness itself. The Examiner further notes that "nothing on the record indicates that

the products are obvious variants of one another." Insofar as Claim 13 refers back to Claim 12, and Claim 12 recites a list of compound that are co-extensive with Claim 1, Applicants respectfully traverse this comments as not comporting with the actual language of the claims. Lastly, the Office indicates that the products have different modes of operation, function, or effect. However, the Office does not articulate those differences, nor how those differences function to render the claimed products patentably distinct." (e.g., see 12/1/06 Response, pages 3 and 4).

[2] The Examiner respectfully disagrees. It was previously submitted that although Groups I and III are directed to related products these inventions are distinct under MPEP § 806.05(j) for the reasons set forth on page 2, paragraph 3 of the 8/31/06 Restriction requirement. Specifically, Groups I and III are mutually exclusive. Group III (i.e., solid phase embodiment) would not anticipate Group I (i.e., the solution phase embodiment) because these inventions claim compounds with different structures (i.e., Group III has a solid support, Group I does not). Furthermore, this distinction would lead to a non-coextensive search in both the patent and non-patent literature because in one case solid supports would have to be searched whereas that would not be the case for the other group. Furthermore, Applicants have not admitted on the record that these two Groups are obvious variants of one another (e.g., see 8/31/06 Restriction, page 5, paragraph 12, "Should applicant traverse on the ground that the species are not patentably distinct, applicant should submit evidence or identify such evidence now of record showing the species to be obvious variants or clearly admit on the record that this is the case. In either instance if the examiner finds one of the inventions unpatentable over the

prior art, the evidence or admission may be used in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) of the other invention"). Here, Applicants have made not such admission that Groups I and III represent obvious variants). Furthermore, it is unclear why Applicants are referring to the text of claim 12 when claim 12 is drawn to Group II, not Group III. Finally, the Examiner made clear that the different mode of operation, function, etc. was the "solid support" difference (i.e., one functions using a solid support, the other does not).

[3] Applicants argue, "the Office has characterized the relationship between Groups II and III as process of making and product made ... The Examiner has provided no indication as to the means or the feasibility of manufacturing other chemical compound libraries using the claimed process." (e.g., see 12/1/06 Response, page 4, middle paragraph).

[3] Supporting "feasibility" documentation is not required. See MPEP § 803 wherein reasons or examples need only be set forth that are in most cases unsupported by documentation.

[4] Applicants argue, "restriction is evaluated in terms of the invention as claimed. If the actual steps of the claim were altered (such as by removing the "random" steps as noted by the Office at paragraph 4 of the Office Action), the resulting claim would no longer be the present invention "as claimed," but rather some other invention." (e.g., see 12/1/06 Response, page 4, middle paragraph).

[4] MPEP § 806.05(f) states, “(2) that the product as claimed can be made by another and materially different process”; it does state, “(2) that the product as claimed can be made by another and materially different claimed process.” Thus, any materially different process (e.g., process without random steps) suffices. In addition, solution versus solid-phase synthesis would also suffice.

[5] Applicants argue, “The Office made no remarks with respect to any patentable distinction between the claims of Group I and Group II. Applicants thus submit that the restriction between these two groups of claims is untenable.” (e.g., see 12/1/06 Response, page 4, second to last paragraph).

[5] Groups I and II are unrelated (e.g., Group II is a method for producing a library, not a single compound). See MPEP § 802.01 and § 806.06. However, to the extent that they could be viewed to contain a relationship (i.e., product and process of making), they would be distinct for the same reasons as set forth for Groups II/III.

8. As a result, the restriction requirement and/or election of species is still deemed proper and is therefore made FINAL.

### *Specification*

9. The specification has not been checked to the extent necessary to determine the presence of all possible minor errors. Applicant's cooperation is requested in correcting any errors of which applicant may become aware in the specification.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, second paragraph***

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

10. Claim 2 and 3 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

A. For **claims 2 and 3**, the claims are indefinite because the R1 and R2 variables are not defined (i.e., the claim doesn't state wherein R1 and R2 are defined as in claim 1). Furthermore, the formula doesn't define the compound but, rather, the "A" portion of said compound (e.g., the value of n is not defined, nor is X and Y). Therefore, claims 2, 3 and all dependent claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112, first paragraph***

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

11. Claims 1-3, 5-11 and 14 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Applicant is directed to the Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 USC 112, ¶ 1 "Written Description"



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Requirement, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 4 pages 1099-1111, Friday January 5, 2001. This is a written description rejection.

Applicants' claims are drawn to oligomeric compounds formed from piperidine and pyrrolidine monomers. These monomers have two sites of substitution (R1 and R2) and the ends of the oligomer are denoted X and Y. Furthermore, the R1 and R2 are broadly defined (i.e. claim 1) and X and Y include in their definitions an "amino-terminal capping group" and "carboxy-terminal capping group" (where the "capping groups" have no structural definition). Such represents very broad scope because the functional "capping" language does not place any limitation on the number of atoms, types of atoms or the manner in which said atoms may be connected to form said capping groups.

In contrast, Applicants have only provided *very limited examples* of compounds within the scope of the claims. These examples only show very narrowly defined R1 and R2 groups (e.g. -CH<sub>3</sub>, -CH<sub>2</sub>OCH<sub>3</sub>, -benzyl) and also narrowly defined X and Y moieties.

The CAFC has also stated that a "written description on an invention involving a chemical genus, like a description of a chemical species, 'requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula [or] chemical name,' of the claimed subject matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials." (e.g., see *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.*, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1405 (1997), quoting *Fiers v. Revel*, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Here, Applicants have failed to provide a definition, structure, formula or chemical name for the capping functionalities. In addition, the CAFC has stated that a genus, which is set forth only in functional terms, "... is not an adequate

written description of the genus because it does not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function” (e.g., see *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.*, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1406 (1997)). Here, Applicants claimed “capping function” can only be distinguished from other compounds by their function (i.e., their ability to cap), which was held to be impermissible in *Lilly*. Just as the generic term “cDNA” did not provide an adequate written description for the broad class of mammalian or vertebrate insulin DNA in *Lilly*, neither does the generic term “capping function” provide an adequate written description for the broad class of X and Y substituents. Furthermore, describing the product (i.e., formula (I)) that is obtained from the prodrug upon metabolic degradation does not provide a written description of the drug prodrug itself. This position is consistent with *Lilly* where the CAFC held that the disclosed protein product (i.e., insulin) did not provide an adequate written description for the DNA encoding that product. In fact, this case is even more egregious than *Lilly* because there is no “genetic code” to correlate the prodrug with the metabolized product.

Thus, applicants have not demonstrated in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms” that they are in possession of the claimed invention especially with regard the X and Y capping function. Furthermore, the general knowledge and level of skill in the art do not supplement the omitted description because no known structure/function relationship and/or chemical properties exists that could otherwise be used to show possession of the claimed X and Y functionalities. In addition, no generally accepted method for producing these unknown compounds has been set forth. It is well settled that claiming only a result (e.g., capping function) fails to satisfy the constitutional requisite of

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promoting the progress of science and the useful arts since this seeks to monopolize all possible ways to achieve a given result (e.g., formyl, acetyl, etc.), far beyond those means actually discovered or contemplated by the inventor, so that others would have no incentive thereafter to explore a field already fully dominated. *O'Reilly v. Morse*, 15 How. 62, *In re Fuetterer*, 50 CCPA 1453, 1963 C.D. 620, 795 O.G. 783, 319 F.2d 259, 138 USPQ 217 ; *Siegel v. Watson*, 105 U.S. Appl. D.C. 344, 1959 C.D. 107, 742 O.G. 863, 267 F.2d 621, 121 USPQ 119.

12. Claims 1-11 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for oligomeric piperidine and pyrrolidine compounds where (1) R1 and R2 are defined as in claim 11 and (2) X and Y are defined as in claim 4, does not reasonably provide enablement for any oligomeric pyrrolidine compound that has R1 and R2 as broadly defined in claim 1 and X and Y as any “capping-group”. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.

It is clear from applicant's specification how one might practice this invention where the oligomeric pyrrolidine compounds have (1) R1 and R2 defined as in claim 11 and (2) X and Y defined as in claim 4; however, there is insufficient guidance as to how to make/use **any** pyrrolidine compound that has R1 and R2 as broadly defined in claim 1 and X and Y as **any** “capping-group”. There are many factors to be considered when determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a determination that a

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disclosure does not satisfy the enablement requirement and whether any necessary experimentation is “undue”. These factors can include, but are not limited to:

- (1) the breadth of the claims;
- (2) the nature of the invention;
- (3) the state of the prior art;
- (4) the level of one of ordinary skill;
- (5) the level of predictability in the art;
- (6) the amount of direction provided by the inventor;
- (7) the existence of working examples; and
- (8) the quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure.

See *In re Wands*, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

The breadth of the claims and the nature of the invention: The claims are drawn to oligomeric compounds formed from piperidine and pyrrolidine monomers. These monomers have two sites of substitution (R1 and R2) and the ends of the oligomer are denoted X and Y. Furthermore, the R1 and R2 are broadly defined (i.e. claim 1) and X and Y include in their definitions an “amino-terminal capping group” and “carboxy-terminal capping group” (where the “capping groups” have no structural definition). Such represents very broad scope.

The state of the prior art and the level of predictability in the art: The examiner’s position is that the art is not predictable to the point that one of ordinary skill could make and use the invention as broadly as it is claimed. Note that the “predictability or lack thereof” in the art refers to the ability of one skilled in the art to extrapolate the disclosed or known results to the claimed invention. If one skilled in the art can readily anticipate the effect of a change within the subject matter to which the claimed invention pertains, then there is predictability in the art. On the other hand, if one skilled in the art cannot readily

anticipate the effect of a change within the subject matter to which that claimed invention pertains, then there is lack of predictability in the art. The structures of possible variants for the claimed R1, R2, X and Y are sufficiently diverse that one of ordinary skill would not be able to predict their structures and/or reactivity in the claimed oligomeric compounds. One of ordinary skill could not guess, *a priori*, how to make and use **any** such oligomeric compounds formed from pyrrolidine monomers as one could not necessarily predict their structure and utility in the absence of any guidance without undue experimentation. Applicant's claimed scope of compounds represents only an invitation to experiment regarding possible oligomeric compounds formed from pyrrolidine monomers having broadly defined R1 and R2 groups and/or where X and Y are any "capping-group". For example, Parsons states, "The significance of particular amino acids and sequences for different aspects of biological activity cannot be predicted *a priori* but must be determined from case to case by painstaking experimental study" (e.g., see Parsons, conclusion). Likewise, the currently claimed "peptide analogs" would be just as susceptible to unpredictable changes in conformation.

The level of one of ordinary skill: The level of skill would be high, most likely at the Ph.D. level. However, such persons of ordinary skill in this art, *given its unpredictability*, would have to engage in undue (non-routine) experimentation to carry out the invention as claimed.

The amount of direction provided by the inventor and the existence of working examples:

The fact that the claimed compounds are oligomeric is important to the question of enablement. R1 and R2 are very broadly defined in all but claim 11. This broad

definition encompasses a variety of cyclic, non-cyclic, heteroatom-containing and non-heteroatom-containing side groups. It is the examiner's position that the linking chemistry for the monomers would be unpredictable in the presence of such widely varying side groups, especially those with heteroatoms therein and/or ones that are sterically bulky. Applicants have only provided *very limited examples* of compounds within the scope of the claims. These examples only show very narrowly defined R1 and R2 groups (e.g. -CH<sub>3</sub>, -CH<sub>2</sub>OCH<sub>3</sub>, -benzyl) and also narrowly defined X and Y moieties. Again, no generic strategy for determining how to make and use **any** R1 and R2 as broadly defined (i.e. claim 1, also claims 5-10) and **any** X and Y that are generically "amino-terminal capping group[s]" and/or "carboxy-terminal capping group[s]". The teachings of the instant specification coupled with the examples only support oligomeric pyrrolidine compounds that have (1) R1 and R2 defined as in claim 11 ***and*** (2) X and Y defined as in claim 4.

The quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the content of the disclosure: The instant specification does not provide to one skilled in the art a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed in making and using the full scope of the claimed compounds. Note that there must be sufficient disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology, to teach those of ordinary skill how to make and use the invention as broadly as it is claimed. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 496 & n.23, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1445 & n.23 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Therefore, it is deemed that further research of an unpredictable nature would be necessary to make or use the invention as claimed. Thus,

due to the inadequacies of the instant disclosure, one of ordinary skill would not have a reasonable expectation of success and the practice of the full scope of the invention would require undue experimentation.

### ***Double Patenting***

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

13. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 11 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-6 of U.S. Patent No. 6,710,186 (referred to herein as '186). An obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but an examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because, for

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example, claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 11 are generic to all that is recited in claims 1-6 of '186. That is, claims 1-6 of '186 fall entirely within the scope of claim 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 11 of the present application or, in other words, claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 11 of the present application are anticipated by claims 1-6 of '186.

For *claim 1*, the '186 application claims the same  $X-\{A\}_n-Y$  compound (e.g., see compare claim 1 of '186 to claim 1 of the current application). Furthermore, '186 claims the same pyrrolidine core structure with the same  $R_1-CH_2$ ,  $R_2-CH_2$  and  $C=O$  substituents (e.g., see claim 1, compound between lines 4 and 5). The '186 also claims the same  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  groups (e.g., see '186, claim 2 wherein  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  = hydrogen). The '186 also claims the same  $X$  and  $Y$  groups (e.g., see claim 1 wherein  $X$  or  $Y$  is hydrogen or an amino-terminal capping group selected from the group consisting of formyl, acetyl, ... and the other of  $X$  or  $Y$  is hydroxyl or a carboxy-terminal capping group selected from the group consisting of  $NH_2$  ... “).

For *claim 2*, the '186 patent claims a pyrrolidine core structure.

For *claim 4*, the '186 patent claims the recited  $X$  and  $Y$  groups (e.g., see claim 1 wherein  $X$  or  $Y$  is hydrogen or an amino-terminal capping group selected from the group consisting of formyl, acetyl, ... and the other of  $X$  or  $Y$  is hydroxyl or a carboxy-terminal capping group selected from the group consisting of  $NH_2$  ... “).

For *claims 5, 10 and 11*, the '186 patent claims, for example,  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  = hydrogen (e.g., see '186, claim 2).

#### ***Contact Information***



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Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Jon D Epperson whose telephone number is (571) 272-0808. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday from 9:00 to 5:30.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, James (Doug) Schultz can be reached on (571) 272-0763. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (571) 273-8300.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is (571) 272-1600.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

Jon D. Epperson, Ph.D.  
March 5, 2007

JON EPPERSON  
PRIMARY EXAMINER

